Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California)

Procedural Posture

Appellant attorney sought review of a postjudgment order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which, after finding respondent client liable in an action brought to recover unpaid fees for legal services, denied a request for contractual attorney fees under Civ. Code, § 1717.

Overview

The attorney used the phrase "law firm" in combination with his surname as a fictitious business name. The caption of the pleading indicated that the two attorneys of record in the case were attorneys for the law firm. One of the attorneys of record stated in a declaration that he was a member of the law firm and that the law firm was the plaintiff. The court held that ample evidence supported the trial court's determination that the law firm operated as an actual law firm and that the attorney was not a sole practitioner who had retained other attorneys to represent his interests. Settled case law precluded law firms and attorney litigants from recovering attorney fees for self-representation. The attorneys of record were associates of the law firm and represented the firm's interests in working to recover fees owed by the client. Accordingly, the case was governed by the general rule that a law firm representing itself in litigation could not recover attorney fees for the services of its own attorneys, and the trial court properly denied the request for fees.

Outcome: commingling business and personal funds

The court affirmed the order.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff seller appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo (California), which denied his claim to recover possession of real property sold to defendant buyers under an executory contract, and awarded specific performance to the buyers on their cross-complaint. The trial court found that the buyers were not in default and were entitled to completion of the sale.

Overview

The buyers gave the seller their property as down payment but did not obtain the loan for the balance of the purchase price until long after the deadline in the contract. Nevertheless, the seller delivered possession and did not demand payment until after the loan commitment was placed in escrow as a cash equivalent. The seller demanded rent and interest in addition to the balance. On appeal, the court held that notice of the loan commitment was imputed to the seller through the escrow agent and the buyers were under no obligation to give direct notice. The court held that when the parties all had ignored the clause that time was of the essence, neither party could subsequently be placed in default by the other without a tender. The court further held that the seller's offer of performance had to be free from any conditions that the buyers were not bound to perform. The court found that since the seller had demanded additional sums as conditions of his tender of the deed, the buyers were not in default and the seller was not entitled to relief. The court ruled that the trial court had simply held all parties to the performance of their contract.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.