Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco

Procedural Posture
Plaintiff clients sought review of the decision of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which granted a summary judgment in favor of defendant attorney in an action for damages for the attorney's malpractice and breach of contract.

Overview
The clients, sole stockholders, contracted with the attorney to implement a tax program to dissolve their corporation and distribute its assets to the clients, and to transfer the assets at the fair market value to two newly-formed corporations, with the intent of providing the clients with long-term capital gain treatment of all the earned surplus. 

Willful killing that was premeditated or that the perpetrator committed after lying in wait define First-Degree and Aggravated Murder.The Internal Revenue Service rejected the tax program, and assessed the clients an additional tax payment. The clients filed an action for malpractice against the attorney. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the attorney's motion. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations had begun to run when the acts of negligence and malpractice, if any, had occurred, which was at the time of advising the tax program and the dissolving of the corporation. The court found that although the attorney's failure to assist the clients in reducing their additional taxes assessed may have been a breach of contract, the clients had not stated a cause of action for a breach of contract against the attorney.

Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney. The court held that there had been no triable issues of fact raised by the clients.

Section 1983 Civil Rights Lawsuit

HOLDINGS: [1]-After tenants filed a motion for mandatory dismissal by reason of failure to prosecute under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.310, 583.360, in a rent dispute, the landlord's assignee no longer had a right to voluntarily dismiss the action pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (b)(1), under case law applying a mere formality test because dismissal was a legal inevitability, although the trial court had not ruled on the motion;

Section 1983 Civil Rights Lawsuit can be filed by someone whose civil rights have been violated. [2]-The assignee's argument that the mandatory dismissal period had been tolled was meritless because the record did not support a contention that pending appeals had stayed trial court proceedings; [3]-It was unclear whether the trial court found that the assignee acted in good faith in dismissing the complaint for an independent reason, and in any event, such a finding would not suffice to grant voluntary dismissal after a motion for mandatory dismissal.
    
Reversed and remanded.

Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California)

Procedural Posture: job description template

Defendant common carrier sought review of a decision by the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California), which entered judgment for plaintiff shipper and denied the carrier's motion for a new trial in the shipper's action for damages allegedly caused by the carrier's negligence in transporting certain goods.

 

Overview

The parties entered into a contract for the transportation of two carloads of orange trees from Florida to California. The carrier's regular line was broken by severe storms and the trees were taken by an alternate route through Colorado and Utah to California. The trees were entirely destroyed by cold weather during transportation. The shipper filed an action to recover damages in which he alleged that the carrier was grossly negligent in ordering the use of the alternate route. The trial court entered judgment for the shipper and denied the carrier's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the trial court erred in overruling the carrier's objection to proof of the market value of the trees at their destination. The court found that the parties had expressly agreed in their contract that the measure of any damages would be the actual invoice cost of the trees at point of shipment. The court determined that the agreement fixing and limiting the value of the goods was fairly made in consideration of a lower freightage, did not operate to exempt the carrier from liability, and was not a violation of public policy.

 

Outcome

The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings.

Appellant sought review of judgment

Procedural Posture: civil defense attorneys

Appellant sought review of judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) which granted summary judgment to respondents in appellant's action for breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. Summary judgment was granted on ground that the management contract between appellant and respondent music group was void because appellant violated the Talent Agencies Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 1700 et seq.

 

Overview

Respondent music group terminated appellant's contract as personal manager of their group. Appellant brought an action for breach of contract by respondent music group and intentional interference with contractual relations by respondent record company. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on the ground that the management contract was void because appellant violated the Talent Agencies Act (the act), Cal. Lab. Code § 1700 et seq., by securing performance engagements for respondent music group without being licensed as a talent agency. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court rejected appellant's argument that his actions were exempt from regulation, holding that even incidental activity in procuring employment for an artist was subject to regulation under the act. Additionally, the court held that the act required a license to engage in procurement activities even if no commissions were received for the service.

 

Outcome

The court affirmed summary judgment for respondents in appellant's action for breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations because a management contract was void where appellant violated statute by securing performance engagements for respondent music group without being licensed as a talent agency.

Court of Appeal of California

Procedural Posture: civil defense attorneys

 

The court was to consider a decision of the Court of Appeal of California, which reversed the trial court's decision that granted a nonsuit in favor of appellee co-counsel in an action brought by appellant attorney for indemnification in connection with a legal malpractice case.

 

Overview

The attorney represented a wife in her divorce proceedings. After the husband filed for bankruptcy, co-counsel was retained to obtain relief from the automatic stay. He gave the attorney bad advice on which the attorney acted, which resulted in the support awards for the wife being declared void. The wife and the husband filed an action against the attorney for malpractice, and the attorney settled the actions in part from her own funds and from insurance funds. The attorney sought indemnification from co-counsel. The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of nonsuit to co-counsel. The supreme court agreed and affirmed. The supreme court held that whether a claim for indemnity was allowable in concurrent or co-counsel cases was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The public policy considerations underlying the rule against subrogation and assignment of legal malpractice claims did not arise in this case because the subrogor was not the client, but the attorney held liable to the client for negligence at least partially attributable to co-counsel. Thus, the trial court erred in granting co-counsel nonsuit.

 

Outcome

The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's decision that reversed the grant of nonsuit to co-counsel in the attorney's action seeking indemnification.

Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California)

Procedural Posture: Corporate Lawyer San Diego

Appellant president of an insurance company sought review of an order by the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which entered judgment in favor of respondent insurance agent and which denied the president a new trial in his action to recover money alleged to have been paid to the agent. The agent and its former partner were a defunct firm that had entered into an agency agreement with the insurance company.

 

Overview

The company advanced sums to the agent after it was discovered that the agent's former partner owed money to the company for premiums he had collected and had not remitted. At the time the money was advanced, the agent was told that, if the accounts were squared up, the agency relationship would continue in spite of the former partner's wrongdoing. Upon withdrawal of the agency two years later, the president sought to recover the sums advanced. The agent contended that he was entitled to the money because termination of the agency was a breach of the agency agreement, which was orally modified at the time the sums were advanced. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. The court found reversible error in a jury instruction on damages, which failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing damages. The instruction directed the jury to measure and calculate damages in a way that the court found usurped the jury's function. The court also found that the agent failed to prove he was damaged by the termination of the agency relationship and that the payment of the money by the company was consideration to the agent's firm for the continuation of the agency.

 

Outcome

The court reversed the order and judgment of the trial court that had found in favor of the agent in an action brought by the president of the insurance company who sought to recover money he paid to the agent.

 

Procedural Posture

The State filed a breach of contract action against defendants, principal and sureties, upon a bond. The answer set up a counter-claim, and judgment was entered against the State by the Sixth District Court, Sacramento County (California) for the amount of the counter-claim. The State appealed the judgment and an order denying a new trial.

 

Overview

Defendants executed a bond for the faithful performance of a contract to build a State prison. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and ordered a new trial. The court held that the State could not be sued--directly nor indirectly--by setting up a counterclaim or setoff. Neither could a judgment be recovered against the State except when permitted by express statute. The court en banc modified its judgment by striking that portion which ordered a new trial because the only error was that the trial court attempted to give judgment against the State.

 

Outcome

The court initially reversed the judgment and order of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. The court en banc modified the court's initial opinion by striking therefrom that portion which ordered a new trial, and by inserting that the trial court was directed to enter judgment that the State had no cause of action against defendants.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California)

Procedural Posture

Appellant attorney sought review of a postjudgment order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which, after finding respondent client liable in an action brought to recover unpaid fees for legal services, denied a request for contractual attorney fees under Civ. Code, § 1717.

 

Overview

The attorney used the phrase "law firm" in combination with his surname as a fictitious business name. The caption of the pleading indicated that the two attorneys of record in the case were attorneys for the law firm. One of the attorneys of record stated in a declaration that he was a member of the law firm and that the law firm was the plaintiff. The court held that ample evidence supported the trial court's determination that the law firm operated as an actual law firm and that the attorney was not a sole practitioner who had retained other attorneys to represent his interests. Settled case law precluded law firms and attorney litigants from recovering attorney fees for self-representation. The attorneys of record were associates of the law firm and represented the firm's interests in working to recover fees owed by the client. Accordingly, the case was governed by the general rule that a law firm representing itself in litigation could not recover attorney fees for the services of its own attorneys, and the trial court properly denied the request for fees.

 

Outcome: commingling business and personal funds

The court affirmed the order.

 

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff seller appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo (California), which denied his claim to recover possession of real property sold to defendant buyers under an executory contract, and awarded specific performance to the buyers on their cross-complaint. The trial court found that the buyers were not in default and were entitled to completion of the sale.

 

Overview

The buyers gave the seller their property as down payment but did not obtain the loan for the balance of the purchase price until long after the deadline in the contract. Nevertheless, the seller delivered possession and did not demand payment until after the loan commitment was placed in escrow as a cash equivalent. The seller demanded rent and interest in addition to the balance. On appeal, the court held that notice of the loan commitment was imputed to the seller through the escrow agent and the buyers were under no obligation to give direct notice. The court held that when the parties all had ignored the clause that time was of the essence, neither party could subsequently be placed in default by the other without a tender. The court further held that the seller's offer of performance had to be free from any conditions that the buyers were not bound to perform. The court found that since the seller had demanded additional sums as conditions of his tender of the deed, the buyers were not in default and the seller was not entitled to relief. The court ruled that the trial court had simply held all parties to the performance of their contract.

 

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.